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THE DEMISE OF ―DRIVE-BY JURISDICTIONAL
RULINGS‖
Howard M. Wasserman*
In an October 2009 Term marked by several significant constitutional
rulings,1 the Supreme Court quietly continued an important multi-term effort towards defining which legal rules properly should be called ―jurisdictional.‖ In each of four cases that considered the issue, the Court
unanimously rejected a jurisdictional characterization of the challenged legal rule.2 These cases continue an almost uninterrupted retreat from the
Court‘s admittedly ―profligate‖ and ―less than meticulous‖ use of the term.3
The Court now rejects ―drive-by jurisdictional rulings,‖ in which a legal
rule has been labeled as jurisdictional only through ―unrefined‖ analysis,
without rigorous consideration of the label‘s meaning or consequence.4
Jurisdiction essentially means ―legitimate authority.‖5 Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to a court‘s constitutional and statutory authority (or power) to hear a class of cases and to consider and resolve the legal and factual
issues raised.6 Adjudicative-jurisdictional rules contrast, and often are confused, with two other types of rules: 1) substantive merits rules that control
real-world conduct and function as rules of decision determining the validity and success of a plaintiff‘s claim for relief from a defendant over a par-
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ticular transaction or occurrence;7 and 2) procedural, or ―claim-processing,‖
rules, which determine how a court processes and adjudicates the claim for
relief, and how the parties and the court behave within the litigation
process.8
The doctrinal move to identify jurisdiction, to create and maintain
clear, determinate lines between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional rules,
and to end rampant overuse and confusion of the concept of jurisdiction, is
a welcome development for which I have argued for several years.9
This Essay examines and critiques the October 2009 Term‘s jurisdictionality rulings and offers some thoughts as to how the Court might continue to develop sharp lines between distinct concepts and eliminate, once
and for all, drive-by jurisdictional rulings.
I. Jurisdiction, Merits, and the ―Reach‖ of Federal Law
The sharpest distinction should be between jurisdiction and substantive
merits—between rules defining a court‘s adjudicative authority and rules
determining the validity and success of a substantive claim of right on its
merits. I have argued previously that, particularly in typical federal statutory and constitutional claims, there should be no overlap between these concepts. Legislatures and courts must maintain sharp, clear, and clean lines
between the issues; success or failure on the merits should not affect whether the court had authority to decide the case.10
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, appears to have drawn just such a sharp line.11 At issue
was extraterritorial application of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act to misconduct by foreign defendants that harmed foreign plaintiffs in
securities transactions on foreign exchanges.12 Justice Scalia insisted (and
the parties did not dispute) that extraterritoriality was a merits question,
properly resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, rather than a jurisdictional
question resolved on a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. As he put it, ―to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask

7

See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511; Wasserman, Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 236; Wasserman, Trichotomy, supra note 6, at 1548.
8
See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1243–44; Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213; Scott Dodson, In Search of
Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 59–60, 71–72 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Removal]
(link); Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 44, 47
(2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/ [hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdictionality] (link).
9
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 662, 669; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579, 584 (2007) [hereinafter Wasserman, Substantiality]
(link); Wasserman, Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 259; Wasserman, Trichotomy, supra note 6, at 1559.
10
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 645; Wasserman, Trichotomy, supra note 6, at 1548.
11
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
12
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (link).
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what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.‖13 The Morrison Court adopted Justice Scalia‘s reasoning from his 1993 dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California.14 Considering extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act, Scalia had insisted that extraterritoriality
has nothing to do with the court‘s jurisdiction and everything to do with
―whether, in enacting [the statute], Congress asserted regulatory power over
the challenged conduct.‖15
Justice Scalia‘s rhetorical framings overlap: If Congress has not asserted regulatory authority over the challenged conduct, the statute does not
reach or prohibit that conduct and does not constrain the defendant. As a
result, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the applicable federal
law. If Congress has asserted regulatory authority over the challenged conduct, the statute does reach and prohibit that conduct and does constrain the
defendant. The plaintiff may prevail on the merits of her substantive claim,
if she can show a violation of the applicable legal rules.
Scalia‘s position presumes that there is something essential, definable,
and recognizable as ―jurisdiction‖ that is, and must remain, distinct from
substantive merits. Jurisdictional rules typically appear in separate provisions, speaking to courts about judicial authority and the categories of cases
that courts can adjudicate.16 They are grounded in unique structural policies
of separation of powers, federalism, and limited federal government.17
Moreover, as Perry Dane has argued, ―[t]he convergence of jurisdictional
and merits issues is . . . awkward for legal doctrine and the legal culture,‖
particularly when that convergence arises too regularly.18 Permitting jurisdiction/merits overlap is generally inconsistent with the federal procedural
system, which is premised on distinctions between them, particularly as
they affect the timing and manner of their resolution.19
We might define the distinct concept of ―merits‖ several ways, although all ultimately get at the same idea. The first approach is that of Justice Scalia in Morrison, who spoke of whether a provision of federal law
―reaches‖—and thereby regulates or prohibits—the defendant‘s conduct,
entitling a plaintiff to relief for the harms caused by that conduct.20 The
13

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (link).
15
Id. at 813; see also Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 688–89 (arguing that the issue of
what real-world conduct a statute shall apply is a merits question).
16
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 676.
17
See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 36–
37 (1994); Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 8, at 47; Dodson, Removal, supra note 8, at 59.
18
Dane, supra note 17, at 47.
19
See Yazoo Cnty. Indus Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (link); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 662–63; Wasserman,
Substantiality, supra note 9, at 597–98.
20
Morrison v. Nat‘l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
14
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same idea may be framed as whether the statute applies to, binds, legally
constrains, or controls some actor or conduct. A second approach holds
that substantive law dictates ―who is entitled to sue whom, for what, and for
what remedy.‖21 The success of a claim of right depends on how a court answers those questions under the applicable legal rule. A plaintiff prevails
on her claim when applicable law permits her to sue this defendant for the
conduct at issue and entitles her to the sought remedy; she fails on her claim
if applicable law does not permit suit against this defendant for this conduct
or for this remedy. A third way phrases the concept in Hohfeldian terms.22
The merits of a claim asks whether the legal rule sued under establishes a
right in the plaintiff and imposes a duty on the defendant and whether the
defendant‘s conduct was inconsistent with that duty, violating the plaintiff‘s
rights and entitling her to some remedy.23 A plaintiff prevails if she can
show a violation of a right/duty combination on the facts at issue; a defendant prevails if the plaintiff cannot show that violation.
However merits are defined, the question of who should win under
substantive law remains distinct from the court‘s adjudicative authority. A
court‘s adjudicative jurisdiction should not depend on the ultimate outcome
of the case.24
In Morrison, there plainly was jurisdiction in the district court. One
provision of the Securities and Exchange Act grants district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of the Act and over all actions to
enforce liability or duties created by the Act.25 In the main run of cases asserting federal claims of right, courts derive jurisdiction from statutes separate from the claim-creating provision—either from the grant of jurisdiction
over all civil actions ―arising under‖ federal law26 or from the grant of jurisdiction over claims brought under or involving a particular statute or category of statutes.27
Although Morrison addressed extraterritorial application of § 10(b),
the Court‘s recognition that merits are about who a federal legal rule reaches and what it prohibits should control the appropriate characterization of
extraterritoriality of other federal laws. Consider the reach of federal anti21

John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2513, 2515 (1998); see Wasserman, Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 236.
22
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1914).
23
See id. at 32; Wasserman, Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 236.
24
Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 976 (2006) (link); Paul J.
Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 166 (1953) (link).
25
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) (link).
26
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (link).
27
See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006) (granting jurisdiction over claims involving patents, trademarks, and copyrights) (link); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over civil rights
claims against state actors) (link); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over Title VII
claims) (link).
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trust law under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).28
This 1982 amendment to the Sherman Act provides that antitrust laws
―shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce . . . with foreign
nations unless . . . such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect‖ on domestic trade or commerce and would otherwise violate the act (if committed purely domestically).29 In F. Hoffman-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., the Supreme Court repeatedly used merits language
in discussing the FTAIA, speaking of the statute‘s ―application‖ and
―reach.‖30
But the Court never specified whether the issue was properly one of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or merits under Rule 12(b)(6). And because
Empagran did not expressly define extraterritoriality as a merits issue, appellate courts have not felt bound to a merits characterization. Instead, they
have found it unnecessary to analyze or resolve the question, in light of
Empagran‘s failure to do so, often simply accepting the posture on which
the lower court had decided the question.31 But judges continue to discuss
extraterritoriality through what properly should be understood as merits
language. Thus, Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit could concur in jurisdictional treatment of the FTAIA, yet also say ―it has been the judgment of
Congress and the Supreme Court that the economic interests of consumers
outside the United States are normally not something that American law is
intended to protect.‖32 Morrison makes explicit what was implicit in Empagran. Which foreign harms American law is (or is not) intended to protect
against—which foreign conduct American statutory law reaches or applies—now is explicitly defined as a merits issue and courts of appeals
should follow that understanding.
Morrison also appears to have formally, if silently, overturned the reasoning in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.33 The Court there affirmed a
jurisdictional dismissal when it held that Title VII did not apply to overseas
employment relations with domestic entities, because Congress did not
clearly express an intent that Title VII apply extraterritorially.34 The Court
rejected the argument that the statute‘s ―broad jurisdictional language‖ indi28

15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006) (link).
Id.; F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 161–62 (2004) (link); Wasserman, Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 242.
30
U.SF. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at. 155.
31
See, e.g., In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 985–
86 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases) (link). For one criticism of the failure to recognize the distinction, see Howard Wasserman, Why Do Courts Keep Getting This Stuff Wrong?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug.
28. 2008), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/why-do-courts-k.html (link).
32
In re DRAM, 546 F.3d at 991 (Noonan, J., concurring).
33
499 U.S. 244 (1991) (link). The explicit holding in Arabian American Oil—that Title VII does
not apply to extraterritorial conduct—was overridden by Congress in § 109 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (1991).
34
Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 250–51.
29
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cated Congress‘s extraterritorial intent, citing several older extraterritoriality cases in which the Court had held there was ―no jurisdiction under‖ a
particular statute.35
Arabian American Oil did not appear to have much life in it anyway.
In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Court had refused to be bound by the jurisdictional characterization in Arabian American Oil because ―the parties did
not cross swords over it,‖ and the Court had not been called upon to determine whether the dismissal was properly based on lack of jurisdiction as
opposed to failure to state a claim.36 In other words, Arabian American Oil
was written off as a drive-by jurisdictional ruling that was not entitled to
precedential value.
To the extent that Arabian American Oil survived Arbaugh, it cannot
survive Morrison. If extraterritoriality is a merits issue as to § 10(b), then it
is a merits issue as to Title VII. Indeed, any question of the reach of federal
law—of whether Congress asserted regulatory authority to reach and prohibit the challenged conduct by the targeted actors—must be deemed a merits
issue.37 This includes issues such as: whether the defendant falls within the
statutory definition of persons regulated by the legal rule (persons on whom
legal duties are imposed); whether the plaintiff falls within the statutory definition of a protected rights-claimant under the legal rule (persons on
whom legal rights or liberties are bestowed); whether the conduct sued
upon is of the kind prohibited by the legal rule;38 and whether the plaintiff
has suffered the type of harm to her rights that is made remediable by the
applicable legal rule. The judgment in all cases focuses on whether the legal rule of decision was violated in the events at issue, and whether the defendant prevails and the plaintiff loses (or vice versa).
Notably, Morrison‘s brief discussion of statutory-reach-as-merits did
not mention or cite Arbaugh, the Court‘s most-recent, seemingly definitive,
statement on the jurisdiction/merits divide.39 Arbaugh unanimously held
that whether a defendant fell within Title VII‘s definition of ―employer‖
was an element of the claim and not jurisdictional.40 The definition appeared in a separate provision from the applicable jurisdictional grants and
did not speak to the court in jurisdictional terms.41 Instead, this and other
35

Id. at 251–53 (discussing cases).
546 U.S. 500, 512–13 (2006).
37
See Morrison v. Nat‘l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); see also Wasserman,
Non-Extant, supra note 6, at 262 (arguing that what Congress does regulate in a statute must remain
within the bounds of what Congress can constitutionally regulate, which is a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction).
38
See Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 68687.
39
546 U.S. 500.
40
Id. at 504. An ―employer‖ is defined as an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce having fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (link).
41
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–16; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 693–94 (arguing that
provisions must speak to courts in express jurisdictional terms to be deemed jurisdictional).
36
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statutory definitions were addressed to the parties and to their real-world
conduct. The key, however, was that Congress had not defined ―employer‖
as jurisdictional.42 This left open the possibility that Congress could have
made this (or any other) statutory element jurisdictional by clearly labeling
it as such.
Morrison did not consider this possibility, however. Nor did it examine § 10(b) for jurisdictional language. Of course, Justice Scalia would
not have found such language even if had he looked. Section 10(b) is addressed only to real-world actors, describing a range of conduct that is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to undertake.43 Morrison‘s
conclusion of non-jurisdictionality thus would have remained unchanged.
The point is that Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to look.
This more absolute line between jurisdiction and merits is a welcome
doctrinal development. Arbaugh‘s plain-statement rule logically leaves it
open to Congress to conflate jurisdiction and merits by making all statutory
elements, and thus all merits questions, into adjudicative-jurisdiction questions simply by being explicit enough. And Arbaugh identifies no limit on
legislative discretion to define something as jurisdictional. Of course, Congress presumably would exercise some prudence, defining only uniquely
important issues as jurisdictional. But there is no rational way to divide
―important‖ elements that should become adjudicative-jurisdictional issues
from less-important elements that should remain merits issues and no rational reason for treating some elements as adjudicative-jurisdictional and
others as merits.44
The possibility of conflation also produces some category errors. A
district court‘s adjudicative jurisdiction should not depend on the outcome
of the litigation.45 But that is what would happen if certain elements were
made jurisdictional. Any plaintiff victory—when a plaintiff carries her
burden as to all the factual issues and shows entitlement to relief and remedy—will be on the merits, of course. But any defendant victory becomes a
jurisdictional dismissal because Congress has labeled issues of statutory
reach as jurisdictional. In such a case, the failure of the claim would deprive the court of jurisdiction.46
Legislative discretion also has the potential to strip plaintiffs of their
jury right. Courts generally resolve disputes of ―jurisdictional fact,‖ facts
on which subject-matter jurisdiction turns, while the jury is the default factfinder on facts that go to substantive merits, particularly in legal actions

42

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–16.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
44
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 661, 678–79, 691; Wasserman, Trichotomy, supra note
6, at 1549.
45
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
46
See Clermont, supra note 24, at 977; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 672.
43
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seeking monetary damages.47 If Congress truly is free to redefine any (or
all) statutory elements as jurisdictional, it is free to shift fact-finding responsibility from the jury to the court.
The way out of this bind is to reject Arbaugh‘s plain-statement rule as
to statutory-reach issues in favor of Morrison‘s absolute declaration that
statutory reach (that is, who the statute regulates or protects and what the
statute prohibits) always is a merits issue. Congress should never define as
jurisdictional any issue of statutory application—i.e., any question of who
can sue whom for what conduct—and a court never should make a congressional-intent inquiry. The merits characterization of extraterritoriality arises
simply because extraterritoriality is about who and what a legal rule reaches, prohibits, or regulates, which per se has nothing to do with the court‘s
adjudicative jurisdiction. The same is true for all other questions of a statute‘s regulatory scope.
II. JURISDICTION AND LITIGATION PRECONDITIONS
The line between jurisdiction and procedure is much fuzzier and softer
in practice,48 although it is also of less procedural consequence.49 This is
particularly true for litigation preconditions, procedural steps that a plaintiff
must satisfy before bringing and maintaining a claim.
Two preconditions are especially common—timely filing of the case in
the appropriate court50 and exhaustion of certain administrative steps prior
to initiating litigation.51 A plaintiff‘s failure to satisfy the precondition prevents the court from resolving the case under applicable law—that is, from
deciding based on full consideration of the merits (however defined).52 The
problem is that courts too casually (and inappropriately) characterize failure
to satisfy the precondition as depriving the trial court of adjudicative authority or power.
A. Three Precondition Cases in October Term 2009
The Court last term decided three precondition cases, concluding in
each that the precondition was not jurisdictional. These decisions specifically demonstrate the Court‘s desire to halt ―profligate‖ and ―less than me47
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 50102, 514; Clermont, supra note 24, at 99091; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 662–65.
48
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (noting that it ―can be confusing‖ in practice).
49
See Dodson, Removal, supra note 8, at 69–70; Wasserman, Trichotomy, supra note 6, at 1553.
50
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 132 (2008) (timeliness of filing claim
in Court of Federal Claims) (link); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207–08 (2007) (timing for filing
notice of appeal) (link); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 446–47 (2004) (time for filing objection to discharge order in bankruptcy) (link).
51
Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1241 (administrative exhaustion); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1982) (same) (link).
52
See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
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ticulous‖53 use of the term jurisdiction, and the reality that fewer provisions
will be found jurisdictional unless they are explicit grants of adjudicative
authority to a court over a class of claims.
The most direct discussion was in Reed Elsevier, where the Court
granted certiorari specifically on the jurisdictionality issue. Reed Elsevier
involved a proposed settlement class of authors in a dispute over electronic
publication.54 The class consisted of both authors who had registered their
copyrights and authors who had not.55 Under federal law, a copyright holder may bring an action in federal court asserting infringement,56 subject to
§ 411(a), which prohibits any enforcement action ―until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with‖ the
copyright laws.57 At issue was whether the district court had authority to
approve the mixed-author class and the settlement, which in turn depended
on whether the registration requirement was a jurisdictional rule.58
Relying on Arbaugh‘s plain-statement requirement, a largely unanimous Court concluded that § 411(a) was not jurisdictional, but simply an ordinary claim-processing rule.59 First, Congress did not clearly label the
provision as jurisdictional. Jurisdiction was conferred on the district court
by two separate provisions—one granting authority over all claims arising
under federal law and one granting jurisdiction specifically over copyright
claims; neither conditioned adjudicative authority on preregistration.60
Second, the Court argued that the registration requirement was subject to
some exceptions, meaning a court could adjudicate claims even where a
plaintiff failed to satisfy the registration precondition, while true jurisdictional rules normally should not allow for such exceptions.61 Third, the
Court pointed to Zipes v. Trans World Airlines (on which Arbaugh had relied), which held that Title VII‘s requirement that discrimination claimants
file charges with the EEOC prior to filing suit was a prerequisite to suit, but
not a jurisdictional prerequisite.62
The confusion in Reed Elsevier derived from the final sentence of
§ 411(a), which provides that if the Copyright Office refuses to register a
copyright, a copyright holder still can bring an infringement claim.63 Specifically, the section provides that the Register of Copyrights may become a
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006).
Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1242.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1241.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1245–46 (discussing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338).
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1246–47 (discussing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 395 (1982)).
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006) (link).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/3/

192

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RST Y LAW RE VIEW C O LLOQ UY

party to the action on the issue of copyright registrability, although ―the
Register‘s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.‖64 But this passing reference to jurisdiction did
not convert § 411(a) into a jurisdictional statute. The sentence simply clarified that ―a federal court can determine ‗the issue of registrability of the
copyright claim‘ even if the Register does not appear in the infringement
suit.‖65 Properly framed, the question under § 411(a) was whether registrability was before the court as one legal and factual issue to be adjudicated
and resolved; it was not about the court‘s power to adjudicate.
Proper characterization of litigation preconditions was a minor subissue in two other cases. First, United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa66 considered whether a bankruptcy court‘s order discharging certain student loan
debt was a void judgment subject to reopening under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4), where the discharge occurred without a judicial finding of undue
hardship and without an adversary proceeding, as required by the bankruptcy laws and the Federal Rules.67 A judgment may be void due to an underlying jurisdictional defect in the ―exceptional case in which the court that
rendered judgment lacked even an ‗arguable basis‘ for jurisdiction.‖68 If the
requirements of an adversary proceeding and a finding of undue hardship
were jurisdictional, the judgment becomes, at least arguably, void. But the
Court held that the undue hardship requirement was merely a precondition
to a party obtaining a discharge order and did not limit the court‘s jurisdiction.69 Similarly, the requirement of an adversary proceeding, derived from
the Bankruptcy Rules, was a procedural one that did not expand or limit the
court‘s adjudicative authority.70
Second, in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, the Court considered whether the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, an administrative agency, had jurisdiction to
arbitrate a minor labor dispute absent proof that the parties had attempted to
resolve the dispute through a pre-arbitration conference.71 The Court first
insisted that the same principles of jurisdictionality for courts apply to administrative agencies empowered to adjudicate particular controversies.72
Profligate and imprecise use of the jurisdictional label was equally inappropriate in either context. Thus, the requirement of a pre-arbitration conference was no more jurisdictional than Title VII‘s requirement of pre-suit
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resort to the EEOC.73 Both are litigation preconditions that do not affect the
court‘s root structural adjudicative authority.
B. Jurisdiction, Merits, Procedure, and Mandatory Procedure
1. Preconditions as Merits
Courts must take care not to overextend jurisdictionality, regardless of
whether the potential conflation is with an element of a claim (as in Morrison or Arbaugh) or with a precondition to initiating litigation (as in Reed
Elsevier74).
But there is a nice question whether non-jurisdictional preconditions
should be understood as procedural claim-processing rules or substantive
merits rules. Procedural rules generally control how parties litigate and
how a court processes a case. They are concerned with the fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process, grounded in policies of litigant autonomy, fairness, judicial efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.75 Like merits
rules, procedural rules are addressed to the parties and to their rights and
obligations.76 But procedural rules are about rights and obligations within
litigation, while merits rules are about real-world rights and duties outside
the four walls of the courtroom.
Nevertheless, some preconditions could be framed as either one. For
example, we might read the copyright laws as making actionable only infringement of registered copyrights. Registration becomes an element of a
copyright claim that the plaintiff must plead and prove. And registration is
something a copyright holder must do in the real world to protect his substantive legal rights. A plaintiff who sues for infringement of an unregistered copyright loses (barring some exception). Why? Because federal law
does not reach a person who infringes an unregistered copyright and does
not prohibit infringement of an unregistered copyright. Stated differently,
the owner of an unregistered copyright cannot sue an infringer for infringement of an unregistered copyright. As a result, the non-registered
copyright holder loses on the substantive merits of his claim.
On this understanding, the Court in Reed Elsevier might have adopted
the more-absolute approach of Morrison, rather than Arbaugh‘s limited focus on congressional intent. Registration now is solely about the reach of
federal copyright law—whether the statute prohibits the defendant‘s infringing conduct, which turns on whether the copyright has been registered—a pure merits issue not affecting subject matter jurisdiction. Again,
the outcome is unchanged—§ 411(a) remains non-jurisdictional. But this
73
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different analysis better respects the divide between substantive merits and
adjudicative jurisdiction.
2. Arbaugh, Congress, and Procedure
On the other hand, most litigation preconditions, including § 411(a) or
the pre-arbitration conference requirement in Union Pacific, look and function procedurally. They control how parties and courts behave in litigation
and dictate steps that a rights-claimant must take to successfully litigate her
rights, including prior to initiating litigation.
Again, the line between adjudicative jurisdiction and pure procedure is
notoriously soft and confusing in practice—certainly softer and more confusing than the line between a court‘s adjudicative authority and the success
of the plaintiff‘s substantive claim of right. The oft-proffered line is that jurisdictional rules separate classes of cases and define whether a court can
exercise power to resolve a class of cases, while procedural rules process
claims and dictate how a court will adjudicate.77 But that is not always
helpful as to procedural rules such as litigation preconditions, because most
could be framed as either one.
A better distinction focuses on underlying values and policy goals.
Adjudicative-jurisdiction rules are grounded in public structural values such
as federalism, separation of powers, and limited federal government.78 Procedural rules are concerned with the fairness and efficiency of the truthfinding process and a party‘s opportunity to present his side of the story;
they focus on individual values such as party autonomy, party control of litigation, efficiency, and fairness.79
In any event, a sharp demarcation between jurisdiction and procedure
is less necessary because the pair so closely align. There is no difference in
the timing or manner of deciding procedure and jurisdiction as there is between merits and jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is one of several procedural preliminaries that courts ideally consider at the outset of litigation. The judge,
rather than jury, serves as fact-finder on any underlying disputed issues for
both jurisdictional and claim-processing rules.80
Given this connection, Arbaugh‘s plain-statement approach is appropriate for separating procedural preconditions from jurisdictional rules and
should be our analytical starting point. Courts should focus their analysis
on whether Congress has defined a precondition as jurisdictional, whether it
used jurisdictional language addressed to the courts and their adjudicative
authority, and whether Congress is serving structural or individual values.
77
See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1243; Dodson, Mandatory Rules, supra note 75, at 11–12 ; Dodson, Removal, supra note 8, at 71–72.
78
Dane, supra note 17, at 36–37; Dodson, Removal, supra note 8, at 59.
79
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L. REV. 693, 724–25 (1974).
80
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If Congress understands its rule as serving the former rather than the latter,
that understanding carries some persuasive force.
Of course, this leaves Congress broad discretion to dictate a rule‘s jurisdictional nature. But that seems appropriate as to preconditions (certainly more appropriate than as to merits rules81), given Congress‘s control over
both federal-court jurisdiction and federal judicial procedure, including the
conditions that parties must satisfy to pursue claims under congressionally
made legal rules.82 Like courts, however, Congress must be meticulous,
precise, and not unduly profligate in defining rules as jurisdictional. In other words, Congress must avoid enacting drive-by jurisdictional statutes—
statutes relying on a careless or unrefined understanding of adjudicative authority.
Reed Elsevier involved such a drive-by statute. Under the original version of § 411(a), the plaintiff had to show registration to proceed with her
infringement action. Registrability was a subissue—a copyright only could
be registered (and thus sued upon) if it was the kind of creative work that
could be copyrighted and registered under the applicable legal rules. The
remainder of § 411(a) established procedural requirements surrounding registrability. The Register of Copyrights made the initial determination of
registrability. An author whose copyright had been denied registration then
could sue on the unregistered copyright and raise registrability as an issue
for the court. If the court decided the copyright was registrable, it would be
treated as a registered copyright on which the author could sue and recover
for infringement. The statue also granted the Register of Copyrights a procedural right to intervene in that action to defend its determination of nonregistrability.83
In 1976, Congress added the last clause to § 411(a), providing that ―the
Register‘s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.‖84 The amendment responded to a series of
lower court rulings, although Congress did not seem to consider the effect
of using the word jurisdiction in the statute.85 The addition means, in effect,
that even if the Register elects not to exercise her statutory right to intervene, the author still can argue to the court that the copyright should have
been registered and the court still can find that it should have been registered and treat it as if it had been. Section 411(a) thus does not address jurisdiction at all. It addresses facts that an author can and must prove to
bring an infringement claim and the procedural rules under which he proves
them.
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The problem was that Congress used ―jurisdiction‖ in that added
clause, which apparently confused the lower courts, as well as many litigants. Fortunately, the Reed Elsevier Court saw through the confusion,
partly because the Justices have made such a jurisprudential point of limiting careless use of the term ―jurisdiction‖ in their decisions. Congress
should follow suit in drafting legislation, avoiding the word unless it really
means to further structural aims and limit judicial authority to adjudicate. In
other words, the solution to drive-by jurisdictional rulings is a combination
of better drafting and better judicial interpretation.
3. Jurisdiction and Mandatory Rules
If jurisdiction and procedure align in terms of timing and fact-finder,
the question becomes, ―Why is it worth separating the jurisdictional from
the merely procedural?‖
One answer is simple formalism. We should isolate what it means for
a rule to truly address a court‘s root structural constitutional and statutory
authority to adjudicate. There is admittedly not a great deal of content to
this, beyond recognition that when we create distinct legal concepts (such
as jurisdiction and procedure) by using different terms, it is awkward to fail
to treat them distinctly or to have them converge too often.86
A different answer centers on the consequence of the characterization.
Adjudicative jurisdictional rules are, by definition, non-waivable. The parties cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction in federal court or waive
an objection to it. Judges at every level have an independent obligation to
raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and the court or a party can
raise jurisdiction at any time throughout the litigation process.87 And, as a
general (although sharply contested) proposition, adjudicative jurisdictional
rules are rigid and inflexible, not allowing for equitable exception or leniency.88
But consequentialism is not essentialism. Jurisdictional rules are always non-consentable and non-waivable; but not all mandatory, nonwaivable, and rigid rules must be jurisdictional. Scott Dodson has argued
that there is room for a class of rules, primarily procedural, that are mandatory but non-jurisdictional. They are grounded in procedural values such as
party autonomy and the fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process
and they speak to the conduct of actors in the litigation process, but they
possess characteristics associated with jurisdictional rules.89 A paradigmatic mandatory procedural rule would be subject to consent, waiver, and for86
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feiture by the party benefitted by the rule, and the court would not have an
independent obligation to raise a defect under the rule. Once the benefitted
party asserts the rule, however, the court is obligated to enforce it and has
no equitable discretion.90
Once we recognize a category of mandatory non-jurisdictional rules,
we further recognize that these rules need not be procedural. One could imagine a substantive merits rule—a rule tied to the reach of a legal prohibition that determines who can sue whom for what real-world conduct—that
nevertheless is endowed with characteristics such as mandatoriness or nonwaivability. Consider state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. Although the Amendment is written as a limitation on the adjudicative jurisdiction granted in Article III, the Court has recognized a
broader state immunity from liability to individuals under federal law.91
This broader immunity sounds like a merits-based limitation on the reach of
congressionally enacted prohibitions.92 For example, in Board of Trustees
v. Garrett,93 the Court held that states were not subject to private suit under
the employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, because
the ADA was not valid legislation within Congress‘s prescriptive authority
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.94 In other words, a constitutional
limitation on Congress‘s legislative power produced a limit on the reach or
application of the ADA (on the conduct prohibited and actors regulated by
the ADA) and the statutory right/duty combinations it creates. As a result, a
private individual could not sue a state, and the state could not be liable to
an individual, for disability discrimination in employment.
Immunity from liability serves important structural values of federalism and respect for the dignity of states as sovereigns entitled to control
their own affairs.95 Thus, even if it operates as merits-based and not a limit
on adjudicative authority, state sovereign immunity properly possesses
some ―jurisdictional‖ characteristics—absence of equitable constraints and
non-forfeitability96—that protect those underlying structural values.
The power to define a rule‘s characteristics (if not its fundamental nature) rests with the rulemaker, which is Congress as to federal statutory
rules. This is significant to the project of limiting jurisdictional profligacy.
Congress may have good reasons for making a particular rule non-waivable,
90
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and there are systemic benefits to rigid and absolute rules.97 Mandatory
non-jurisdictional rules—whether procedural or merits-based—further systemic objectives without overexpanding or distorting the concept of adjudicative jurisdiction.98
The Court arguably took this course, at least implicitly, in John R.
Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,99 which considered whether the United
States forfeited its statute of limitations defense. The United States can be
sued for monetary claims—sounding in the Constitution, federal law, contract, quasi-contract, or non-tort liquidated damages—with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Court of Claims.100 Such claims are subject to a statute
of limitations: ―Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed
within six years after such claim first accrues.‖101 Although statutes of limitations typically should be (and are) treated as substantive-merits defenses,102 the Court of Claims gave § 2501 a jurisdictional cast because of
its connection to federal sovereign immunity and the need to preserve the
underlying value of sovereign dignity. Actions against the United States in
the Court of Claims are available only because Congress waived sovereign
immunity; that waiver was valid only under certain conditions, one of
which was timely commencement of the action. Stated differently, the
Court of Claims had jurisdiction only if sovereign immunity was waived,
and the waiver of sovereign immunity was limited only to timely filed
claims.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States had not
waived the limitations defense and that the lower court was obligated to
raise timeliness sua sponte.103 Importantly, however, the Court avoided explicitly labeling the limitations issue as jurisdictional, instead labeling it a
―more absolute‖ limitations statute.104 In other words, § 2501‘s limitations
period possesses a jurisdictional characteristic, but is not truly a jurisdictional rule because it is not tied to the court‘s raw structural authority and it
is not grounded in structural constitutional concerns and values. This holds
true whether we call the limitations defense procedural or merits-based.
John R. Sand recognized and applied Dodson‘s category of special, absolute, mandatory, but still non-jurisdictional, legal rules, although (unfortunately) without saying so.
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III. WHITHER BOWLES?
The only remaining question is what to do about Bowles v. Russell,105
the one recent Supreme Court case to characterize a timing rule as jurisdictional. Bowles concerned the jurisdictionality of the statutory 30-day time
limit for an appeal from a district court judgment.106 A divided Court held
that the appeal in a habeas case was untimely when the notice of appeal was
filed after the 30-day period had expired, even though the appellant had
filed within the time set by the district court order. Because the time period
was jurisdictional, it was not subject to equitable tolling, judicial override,
or other exception.107 The keys, Justice Thomas insisted for a five-Justice
majority, were that the appeals time limit appeared in a statute rather than a
rule of procedure and that a long and venerable line of precedent, left undisturbed by Congress, had treated § 2107 as jurisdictional.108
Bowles has been controversial, within the Court and in scholarly commentary, for many of the reasons addressed in this essay. First, the rulestatute distinction seems a non sequitur; that a rule of procedure cannot affect jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that all statutes do affect jurisdiction.109 There must be separate analysis of whether, because of its text,
structure, and underlying policy goals, a statute should be deemed jurisdictional. Second, the Court ignored the possibility that this was a mandatory
but nonjurisdictional rule.110 Third, as Justice Souter argued in dissent, the
majority disregarded the Court‘s inexorable march away from profligate jurisdictional rulings, inappropriately relying on earlier drive-by rulings as
controlling precedent.111 That criticism is more relevant in light of every
other case prior and subsequent to Bowles, which have uniformly held the
rule at issue to be non-jurisdictional (or, as in John R. Sand, avoided labels
altogether).112
But Bowles must somehow fit within the otherwise opposite doctrinal
pull, a question over which Justices Thomas and Ginsburg tangled in Reed
Elsevier. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas insisted that ―Bowles
stands for the proposition that context, including this Court‘s interpretation
of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute
ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.‖113 Bowles thus reflects a balance between Arbaugh‘s plain-language approach and considerations of history and
precedent.
105
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But in a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg sought to reconcile the
―undeniable tension‖ between Arbaugh and Bowles.114 Bowles, she insisted,
was a stare decisis case in that the Court relied on a long line of Supreme
Court decisions treating the time for appeal as jurisdictional. On the other
hand, the long history of cases treating § 411(a) as jurisdictional (which the
Court ignored) all came from lower courts and most of these were ―‗driveby jurisdictional rulings‘ that should be accorded ‗no precedential effect‘‖.115
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg‘s distinction—an effort to retain
Bowles in the face of contrary doctrine—is untenable. Congress is as aware
of lower-court statutory interpretations, is just as able to overturn them or
leave them undisturbed, and in recent years has been very willing to respond to them.116 Indeed, the confusion in Reed Elsevier itself was triggered by a statutory amendment—the final sentence of § 411(a)—that was
enacted to overturn a series of lower-court rulings.117 There is no basis for
treating lower-court decisions as providing less of a historical trail than Supreme Court decisions. Congress can respond (or not) to either group
equally well. And if lower court decisions can be derogated as drive-by rulings not entitled to precedential effect, so can Supreme Court decisions.
At the end of the day, Bowles simply may remain an outlier, justified
only by stare decisis and the historical pedigree of the Court‘s precedent. In
fact, that view is arguably confirmed by Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court (including Justice Thomas) in Union Pacific, describing
Bowles as ―relying on a long line of this Court‘s decisions left undisturbed
by Congress.‖118
CONCLUSION
October Term 2009 was a good one for commentators, such as me,
who want the federal courts to be more precise and accurate in speaking of
jurisdiction. The Court rejected a jurisdictional characterization in every
case, always doing so unanimously. And the Court not only reached the
right result, but it used correct analysis to get there, particularly in adopting
Justice Scalia‘s definitive divide between merits and jurisdiction in Morrison.
The Court apparently is not finished undoing profligate and nonmeticulous use of the concept of jurisdiction, moving towards a sharper dis-
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tinction between judicial adjudicative authority on the one hand and merits
or procedure on the other.
For example, in November oral arguments in Ortiz v. Jordan,119 the
colloquy detoured into the jurisdictional nature of the rule that challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised on appeal if not presented
first on a postverdict motion in the district court.120 Justice Alito pushed
counsel on whether Rule 50(b) could be a jurisdictional rule in light of recent cases defining procedural claim-processing rules as non-jurisdictional;
counsel tried to distinguish between jurisdiction and power, to which Justice Ginsburg correctly insisted that ―jurisdiction is power, power to proceed in a case.‖121
More directly, the Court will hear Henderson v. Shinseki,122 considering
the jurisdictionality of the 120-day period for seeking judicial review of an
agency decision regarding a claim for veterans‘ benefits. The lower court
found the period jurisdictional, relying on Bowles. Perhaps Henderson will
determine the future and continued vitality of the lone outlier decision in
the Court‘s otherwise consistent and welcome move to end drive-by jurisdictional rulings.
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